vatraxaki
Junior Member level 1
A. Haurie and J. Krawczyk, An Introduction to Dynamic Games
This book is available online at
**broken link removed**
Contents
Chapter I. Foreword 5
I.1. What are dynamic games? 5
I.2. Origins of this book 5
I.3. What is different in this presentation 6
Part 1. Foundations of Classical Game Theory 7
Chapter II. Elements of Classical Game Theory 9
II.1. Basic concepts of game theory 9
II.2. Games in extensive form 10
II.3. Additional concepts about information 15
II.4. Games in normal form 17
II.5. Exercises 20
Chapter III. Solution Concepts for Noncooperative Games 23
III.1. Introduction 23
III.2. Matrix games 24
III.3. Bimatrix games 32
III.4. Concave m-person games 38
III.5. Correlated equilibria 45
III.6. Bayesian equilibrium with incomplete information 49
III.7. Appendix on Kakutani fixed-point theorem 53
III.8. Exercises 53
Chapter IV. Cournot and Network Equilibria 57
IV.1. Cournot equilibrium 57
IV.2. Flows on networks 61
IV.3. Optimization and equilibria on networks 62
IV.4. A convergence result 69
Part 2. Repeated and sequential Games 73
Chapter V. Repeated Games and Memory Strategies 75
V.1. Repeating a game in normal form 76
V.2. Folk theorem 79
V.3. Collusive equilibrium in a repeated Cournot game 82
V.4. Exercises 85
Chapter VI. Shapley’s Zero Sum Markov Game 87
VI.1. Process and rewards dynamics 87
VI.2. Information structure and strategies 87
VI.3. Shapley’s-Denardo operator formalism 89
Chapter VII. Nonzero-sum Markov and Sequential Games 93
VII.1. Sequential games with discrete state and action sets 93
VII.2. Sequential games on Borel spaces 95
VII.3. Application to a stochastic duopoloy model 96
Index 101
Bibliography 103
This book is available online at
**broken link removed**
Contents
Chapter I. Foreword 5
I.1. What are dynamic games? 5
I.2. Origins of this book 5
I.3. What is different in this presentation 6
Part 1. Foundations of Classical Game Theory 7
Chapter II. Elements of Classical Game Theory 9
II.1. Basic concepts of game theory 9
II.2. Games in extensive form 10
II.3. Additional concepts about information 15
II.4. Games in normal form 17
II.5. Exercises 20
Chapter III. Solution Concepts for Noncooperative Games 23
III.1. Introduction 23
III.2. Matrix games 24
III.3. Bimatrix games 32
III.4. Concave m-person games 38
III.5. Correlated equilibria 45
III.6. Bayesian equilibrium with incomplete information 49
III.7. Appendix on Kakutani fixed-point theorem 53
III.8. Exercises 53
Chapter IV. Cournot and Network Equilibria 57
IV.1. Cournot equilibrium 57
IV.2. Flows on networks 61
IV.3. Optimization and equilibria on networks 62
IV.4. A convergence result 69
Part 2. Repeated and sequential Games 73
Chapter V. Repeated Games and Memory Strategies 75
V.1. Repeating a game in normal form 76
V.2. Folk theorem 79
V.3. Collusive equilibrium in a repeated Cournot game 82
V.4. Exercises 85
Chapter VI. Shapley’s Zero Sum Markov Game 87
VI.1. Process and rewards dynamics 87
VI.2. Information structure and strategies 87
VI.3. Shapley’s-Denardo operator formalism 89
Chapter VII. Nonzero-sum Markov and Sequential Games 93
VII.1. Sequential games with discrete state and action sets 93
VII.2. Sequential games on Borel spaces 95
VII.3. Application to a stochastic duopoloy model 96
Index 101
Bibliography 103
